Defendant attorney appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco (California), which held in favor of plaintiff brother-in-laws in an action to recover profits related to a real estate transaction.
The brother-in-laws of the attorney brought an action against him alleging that the attorney secretly made profits in a real estate transaction in which it was claimed that the attorney acted as agent and attorney for the brother-in-laws. The trial court held in favor of the brother-in-laws and the attorney appealed, arguing that his client was his wife, and that his obligation as an attorney was to discuss the questions of duty and responsibility with her. The court ruled that the trial court was justified in holding that primarily the attorney was acting sui juris and associated himself with a representative of a company leasing the real estate to obtain the lease. Further, the employment lawyer riverside held that the attorney was not set in motion by his wife acting as a cotenant, but he afterward acted for her as her attorney in the same degree in which he acted as attorney for each of the brother-in-laws. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the brother-in-laws, concluding that the evidence did not support the attorney’s contention that there was absolutely no evidence in the record that he was the attorney for anyone other than his wife.
The judgment in favor of the brother-in-laws was affirmed.
Respondent, an entity charged with granting and administering licenses for content scrambling system (CSS) technology, sued appellant web publisher for trade secret misappropriation. A Santa Clara County superior court issued an injunction against posting information related to the CSS program. The Court of Appeal (California) reversed, finding an invalid prior restraint. The court granted review to decide the constitutional question.
Defendant was charged with murder. It was alleged for death eligibility that he did so under the special circumstances of (1) felony-murder robbery, and (2) felony-murder burglary. It was further alleged that, during the commission of each of these offenses, defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, and that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death. After reviewing all of defendant’s claims of error, the court concluded that his motions for a continuance, suppression, and dismissal were properly denied. Defendant was not deprived of a speedy trial, the prosecutor did not improperly comment on his failure to testify, evidence was properly admitted, the jury instructions were proper, a juror was properly excluded for cause, the prosecutor’s reference to the bible in his closing argument was not prejudicial, and the objection to defendant’s attempt, in its closing argument, to compare defendant’s crime to the facts of other well known murders was properly sustained. The court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence.
The publisher posted a decryption program that defeated copy protections provided by CSS for digital versatile discs (DVDs). In reversing, the court considered the narrow question of whether the preliminary injunction violated the publisher’s First Amendment right to free speech, assuming the factual findings as true. The court concluded that the injunction was content neutral and, under the Madsen lesser-level of scrutiny, burdened no more speech than necessary to serve the government interests at stake, including protection of trade secrets and benefits to research and development. The court reasoned that: (1) there was no less restrictive way of protecting the property interest in trade secrets; (2) prohibiting the publisher, who knew that the trade secrets were acquired by improper means, from disclosure upheld commercial ethics; and (3) the expressive content did not substantially relate to a legitimate matter of public concern. Because the injunction was content neutral and was issued following unlawful conduct, the court also held that it was not a prior restraint. Nothing suggested that an analysis under California’s free speech clause would yield a different result.
The court reversed the judgment of the appeals court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
